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Abstract
Black-box adversarial attacks on video recognition mod-
els have been explored. Considering the temporal inter-
actions between frames, a few methods try to select some
key frames, and then perform attacks on them. Unfortu-
nately, their selecting strategy is independent with the at-
tacking step, resulting in the limited performance. Instead,
we argue the frame selection phase is closely relevant with
the attacking phase. The key frames should be adjusted ac-
cording to the attacking results. For that, we formulate the
black-box video attacks into Reinforcement Learning (RL)
framework. Specifically, the environment in RL is set as the
threat model, and the agent in RL plays the role of frame
selecting. By continuously querying the threat models and
receiving the attacking feedback, the agent gradually ad-
justs its frame selection strategy and adversarial perturba-
tions become smaller and smaller. A series of experiments
demonstrate that our method can significantly reduce the
adversarial perturbations with efficient query times.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved great suc-
cess in a wide range of tasks [16, 21, 4]. Despite this fact,
it is proved that deep neural networks are vulnerable to ad-
versarial samples [8]. Recent works have shown that adding
a carefully crafted, small human-imperceptible perturbation
to a clean sample can fool the DNNs, resulting in them to
make wrong predictions with high confidence [1, 8]. Nowa-
days, more and more DNN models are deployed in various
sectors with high-security requirements, the study of adver-
sarial examples has aroused great attention. Due to many
real-time video classification systems are constructed based
on the DNN models, it is crucial to investigate the adver-
sarial samples for video models. On the one hand, video
attacks can help researchers understand the working mech-
anism of deep models. On the other hand, adversarial sam-
ples facilitate various deep neural network algorithms to as-
sess the robustness by providing more varied training data
Figure 1. An example of sparse black-box video attack with Rein-
forcement Learning (RL). The clean video (top) can be recognized
correctly. The adversarial video (bottom) produced by our pro-
posed method is mis-classified. Note that only one frame (green-
red line annotation) is adaptively selected by the RL, and very
small perturbations are added on the key frame.
[22, 7].
According to [12], the current video attacking methods
can be roughly divided into two classes. The first class is
called dense attack which pollutes each frame in a video
[17, 13], and the second class is to firstly select some key
frames, and then generates perturbations on these selected
frames [22, 23], called as sparse attack. Compared with the
dense attack, the sparse attack is more reasonable because
there are temporal interactions between adjacent frames in
the video. Utilizing this relationship can help both reduce
the adversarial perturbations and improve the efficiency of
generating process. For the former advantage, because the
selected frames are the most important ones in a video, only
adding small perturbations on these frames can fool the
threat model, leading to the reduction of adversarial per-
turbations on the whole video. For the second advantage,
the selected key frames are usually sparse, compared with
generating perturbations on the whole frames, the operation
of dealing with a few frames is more efficient.
To better select key frames in the sparse attack, a heuris-
tic black-box attacks on video recognition models is pro-
posed [23]. They firstly propose a heuristic algorithm to
evaluate the importance of each frame, and then select key
frames by sorting the importance scores, finally, the black-
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Figure 2. Overview of the black-box adversarial video attacking method. We formulate the key frame selection and attacking step into an
end-to-end reinforcement learning framework. Please see the texts for details.
box attacks are performed on the selected frames. However,
there are no interactions between the attacking process and
the selecting key frames in their method. We argue that key
frame selection is not only relevant to the video itself, but
also the feedback from threat models. The frame selection
and video attacking should be mutual guidance and coop-
eration. The results of this way can produce more accurate
key frames and smaller perturbations for adversarial videos.
To this end, we present a Sparse black-box Video At-
tack (SVA) method with Reinforcement Learning (RL) in
this paper. Specifically, the environment in RL is set as
the threat models, and the agent in RL plays the role of
frame selecting. By continuously querying the threat mod-
els and receiving the feedback of predicted probabilities (re-
ward), the agent adjusts its frame selection strategy and per-
forms attacks (action). Step by step, the optimal key frames
are selected and the smallest adversarial perturbations are
achieved.
Technically, for the agent, we use an LSTM-based net-
work to measure the importance of each frame. Combined
with Bernoulli, the adaptive key frames are selected. To
perform the black-box attacks, the Natural Evolution Strat-
egy (NES) [11] is utilized to estimate the gradient from the
threat models, and then the adversarial videos are generated
based on these gradients. For the reward, we design two
kinds of functions, the first one comes from the video itself.
For example, the frames with big action changes will have a
high confidence to be the key frames. The other one comes
from the feedback of attacking threat models. The insight
is that if the frames with tiny perturbations will lead to a
big drop of predicted probability, these frames will have the
high confidence to be the key frames. Figure 1 shows an ad-
versarial video generated by our proposed method. Figure
2 overviews the proposed method. Our major contributions
can be summarized as follows:
• We are the first one to use reinforcement learning to
attack video recognition models in the black-box set-
ting. The previous works aim to attack the reinforce-
ment learning model. We are different from them.
• An algorithm is designed for selecting key frames
from a video when attacking video recognition mod-
els, which is based on two factors including the visual
features of the video itself and the feedback given by
the threat model. Video attacking and key frame se-
lecting are cooperated and guided by each other.
• Extensive experiments on two widely used video
recognition models (LRCN and C3D) and two bench-
mark video datasets (UCF-101 and HMDB-51) show
that the proposed method can significantly reduce the
adversarial perturbations while only needs fewer query
times compared with the state-of-the-art video attack-
ing methods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we briefly review the related work. The proposed algorithm
is described in Section 3. The experimental results and anal-
ysis are presented in Section 4. Finally, we summarize the
conclusion in Section 5.
2. Related Work
Adversarial Attack on Video Models: Adversarial at-
tacks on images have been extensively studied. In the past
years, adversarial attacks have been extended to video data.
An l2,1-norm regularization based optimization algorithm
is the first method which is proposed to compute the sparse
adversarial perturbations for video recognition [22]. The
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3D universal perturbation [17] is generated by Generative
Adversarial Networks offline and then used with unseen in-
put for the real-time video recognition model. Unlike such
white-box attack algorithms which need some knowledge
about the video recognition models, Jiang et al. utilize
tentative perturbations and partition-based rectifications to
obtain good adversarial gradient estimates and high attack
success rate in the black-box setting [13]. But attacking on
all frames of the video would cause more perturbations and
poor robustness of the adversarial video. Another black-box
method is proposed by Wei et al. [23], they heuristically
search a subset of frames and the adversarial perturbations
are only generated on those selected frames, but the pro-
cesses of attacking and key frames selection are separated
from each other, the perturbations of adversarial videos are
still unsatisfactory.
Unlike the algorithms mentioned above, our method gen-
erates adversarial perturbations on the key frames which are
selected by an agent that trained using visual features of the
video and the feedback of attacking. Our method could gen-
erate smaller adversarial perturbations than state-of-the-art
black-box video attack methods.
Deep Reinforcement Learning: Deep reinforcement
learning is originally designed for learning and mimicking
human decision-making processes, which aims to enable
the agent to make appropriate behaviors according to the
current environment through continuous interaction with
the environment [18]. It doesn’t require any supervisory
information unlike supervised machine learning methods,
but rather receives a reward signal to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the action. Reinforcement learning has received a
lot of attention since the AlphaGo beats humans. Computer
vision tasks have also benefited from deep reinforcement
learning in recent years. For example, Zhou et al. have ap-
plied deep reinforcement learning to train a summarization
network for video summary [25]. Dong et al. use rein-
forcement learning for action recognition [6]. The process
of discarding some irrelevant frames is a kind of hard at-
tention mechanism in their method. Besides, it has been
applied in some other fields like tracking, segmentation and
person search [18].
However, there is no example that deep reinforcement
learning is applied in generating adversarial examples. Re-
inforcement learning algorithms have similar implementa-
tion mechanisms with adversarial attack algorithms, espe-
cially black-box attack algorithms. It is the first time that
we attempt to apply reinforcement learning to the video
black-box adversarial attacks. An agent is designed to se-
lect key frames while attacking a video using a novel reward
function. The key frames selection and adversarial attack
are mutual guidance and cooperation in the whole attacking
process.
3. Methodology
Sparse black-box video attack with reinforcement learn-
ing is described in this section. The adversary takes the
video classifier F(·) as a black-box oracle and can only get
its output of the top one class and its probability. Specif-
ically, give a clean video x and its ground-truth label y¯,
F(·) takes x as an input and outputs the top one class la-
bel F(x) = y and its probability P (y|x). If the prediction
is correct, then y = y¯. The adversarial attack aims to find
an adversarial example xadv which can make F (xadv) 6= y¯
in the un-targeted attack or F (xadv) = yadv in the targeted
attack with the targeted adversarial class yadv , while keep-
ing the adversarial example xadv satisfying the condition:
‖ xadv − x ‖ρ≤ adv , where adv is the bound of the per-
turbation , the ρ in Lρ-norm can be set 1,2,∞.
3.1. Video Attacking
The attack algorithm in our method is built based on Fast
Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [8], which is originally de-
signed for image models. It is defined as:
xadv = x+ α · sign(Oxladv(x)), (1)
where α is the step size. sign(.) is sign function. ladv(x)
is abbreviated for adversarial loss function, which is de-
scribed with ladv(x) = −l(F (x), y¯) in un-targeted attack
and ladv(x) = l(F (x), yadv) in targeted attack. Oxladv(x)
is the gradient of the adversarial loss. Due to black-box
settings, we cannot get the gradient from the threat model
directly, NES [11] algorithm is used as gradient estima-
tor in our method. For NES algorithm, it first generates
n/2 values δi v N(0, I), i ∈ {1, 2...n/2}, where n is
the number of samples. Then, it sets δj = −δn−j+1, j ∈
{(n/2 + 1), ..n}. Finally, the gradient can be estimated as:
OE[F (x)] ≈ 1
σn
n∑
i=1
δiP (y|x+ σ · δi), (2)
where σ is the search variance.
We extend FGSM with NES from image models to video
models. To deal with the high dimensional video data and
improve the attack efficiency, the agent is used to select key
video frames at the beginning. Next, the initial perturba-
tions of the key frames are generated by a white box at-
tack on a pre-trained image model. Due to transferability
of the adversarial examples, this approach can provide use-
ful guidance for exploring space and help reduce the num-
ber of queries. Then, we gradually update the key video
frames using FGSM until the attack succeeds or fails. Note
that the core contribution in our method is to introduce
RL to select key frames, rather than the attacking method
module. Therefore, we choose a simple and widely used
FGSM+NES method. Other methods like Opt-attack [2, 3]
can also be available.
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More specifically, for the targeted attack process, some
key frames from a clean video are replaced with the cor-
responding frames of the target video (e.g. x0 = x
′
and
F (x
′
) = yadv) and then the perturbation bound  is grad-
ually reduced from 1 (for normalized inputs x ∈ [0, 1]) to
adv while keeping the targeted class as the top one class.
For the un-targeted attack, some key frames of an original
clean example are selected as victims and the perturbations
are added until the attack succeeds or fails.
3.2. Key Frame Selection
Videos have successive frames in the temporal domain,
thus, we consider to search key frames that contribute the
most to the success of an adversarial attack. In our ap-
proach, key frames selection is considered as a one step
Markov decision process. Figure 2 provides a sketch map
of this process. The agent learns to select the frames by
maximizing the total expected reward by interacting with
an environment which provides the rewards and updating
its actions.
The input of the agent is a sequence of visual features
of the video frames {vt}Tt=1 with the length T. The agent
is a bidirectional Long-Short Term Memory network (BiL-
STM) topped with a fully connected (FC) layer. The BiL-
STM takes as input the entire visual features {vt}Tt=1 and
produces corresponding hidden states {ht}Tt=1. We use the
ResNet18 [10] to extract visual features and set the dimen-
sion of hidden state in the LSTM cell to 128 throughout this
paper. Each ht contains both information from the forward
hidden state hft and the backward hidden state h
b
t , which is
a good representation of the time domain information of its
surrounding frames. The FC layer that ends with the sig-
moid function predicts a probability pt for each frame, and
then the key frames at are sampled via a Bernouli function:
pt = sigmoid(W × ht), (3)
at = Bernoulli(pt), (4)
where at ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the tth frame is se-
lected or not.
The reward reflects the quality of different actions. It
contains two components in our method: the reward from
the inherent attributes of the video itself and the reward
from the feedback of the threat model. The former re-
ward include diversity reward Rdiv and representative re-
ward Rrep [25]. Let the indices of the selected frames be
K = {ki|aki = 1, i = 1, ..|K|}, the reward Rrep and Rdiv
can be defined as:
Rrep = exp(− 1
T
T∑
t=1
mint′∈K‖vt − vt′‖2), (5)
Rdiv =
1
|K|(|K| − 1)
∑
t∈K
∑
t′∈K,t′ 6=t
d(vt, vt′ ), (6)
where d(·, ·) is the dissimilarity function calculated by
d(xt, xt′ ) = 1−
vTt vt′
‖vt‖2‖vt′‖2
. (7)
The reward from the feedback of the threat model is defined
as:
Rattack =

0.999× exp( −P
0.05
) 30000 > Q > 15000
exp(
−P
0.05
) Q 6 15000
−1 Q > 30000,
(8)
where Q is the number of queries, P is the mean perturba-
tion of the adversarial video (MAP), 0.05 is a normalization
factor, 0.999 is the penalty factor used for reducing the num-
ber of queries. The rewards Rdiv , Rrep and Rattack com-
plement to each other and work jointly to guide the learning
of the agent:
R = Rdiv + γ1Rrep + γ2Rattack. (9)
The hyperparameters γ1 and γ2 are set according to the pa-
rameter tuning.
Since each frame corresponds to two actions, there are
2T possible executions of a video, which is basically not
feasible for deep Q learning. Thus, we employ the policy
gradient method to make the agent learn a policy function
piθ with parameters θ by maximizing the expected reward
J(θ) = Epθ(a1:T )[R]. Following the REINFORCE algo-
rithm proposed by Williams [24], we approximate the gra-
dient by running the agent for N episodes on the same video
and then taking the average gradient:
OθJ(θ) ≈ 1
N
N∑
n=1
T∑
t=1
(Rn − b)Oθlogpiθ(at|ht), (10)
where Rn is the reward computed at the nth episode. The
number of episodes N is set to 5 in our experiments. The
Rattack reward is estimated by the shortest key frame se-
quence in those episodes in our experiments. b is a constant
baseline that is used to alleviate the high variance. For com-
putational efficiency, it is set as the moving average of re-
wards experienced so far. We optimize the policy function
via Adam [14].
3.3. Overall Framework
Here, the whole process of our method in targeted setting
is described in Algorithm 1, which is a continuous-learning
algorithm. The epsilon decay 4 is used to control the re-
duction size of the perturbation bound. 4 and FGSM step
size α are dynamically adjusted as described in subsection
3.4. In the algorithm, φ(·) is the function to extract ini-
tial perturbations though a pre-trained ImageNet model like
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Algorithm 1: Our SVA targeted attack
Input : The classifier F(·), target class yadv and
clean video x.
Output : Adversarial video xadv .
Parameters: Perturbation bound adv , epsilon decay
4, FGSM step size α.
1 for i = 1 to epochs do
2 M ← Agent(x), ← 1, xadv ← video of the
target yadv .
3 xadv ← x× (1−M) + xadv ∗M .
4 while  > adv do
5 v = 0, h = φ(xadv).
6 v̂ = v + Ovladv(xadv + h),
ĝ = sign(v̂ ×M), ̂← −4.
7 x̂adv ← CLIP (xadv − α · ĝ, x− ̂, x+ ̂).
8 if yadv = F (x̂adv) then
9 xadv ← x̂adv , ← ̂.
10 else
11 x̂adv ← CLIP (xadv −α · ĝ, x− , x+ ).
12 if yadv = F (x̂adv) then
13 xadv ← x̂adv .
14 end
15 end
16 Adjust4 according to the current situation.
17 end
18 Compute rewards Rdiv , Rrep and Rattack and
update Agent.
19 end
20 return xadv
ResNet50 [10]. The zero vector M has the same size with
the input video and its some values will be set to 1 after the
agent is trained. The agent in the whole process of attacking
is updated with the rewards’ values, which is dynamic and
interactive.
3.4. Implementation Details.
To follow the query limited black-box settings and make
our experiments more convenient, the maximum query
number is set to 3×104 in the un-targeted mode and 6×104
in the targeted mode for all black-box attack algorithms in
our experiments. For NES, we set the population size as 48,
which works well on different datasets in terms of the suc-
cess rate or the number of queries. For search variance σ
in NES, because the targeted attack needs to keep the tar-
get class in the list of top one classes to get the target class
score, rather than the un-targeted attack is to remove the cur-
rent class from the top one position, we set it to 10−6 for the
targeted attack setting and 10−3 for the un-targeted attack
setting. The adjustment of step size α adopts the strategy in
the article [19]. For the targeted attack, we adjust the step
Figure 3. Hyperparameters tuning on randomly selected 20 videos
and the C3D model with our un-targeted SVA. (A) γ2 tuning. (B)
γ1 tuning. (C)  tuning.
Table 1. The accuracy of the used video recognition models.
Models DatasetsUCF-101 HMDB-51
C3D 85.88% 59.57%
LRCN 75.44% 34.58%
size α and epsilon decay M dynamically. If the proportion
of the adversarial examples cannot be maintained above the
threshold 50%, the step size α is halved. If we can’t reduce
the perturbation size  after 20 times in a row, we cut the
epsilon decay M in half.
There are three hyperparameters in our method, and we
obtain their best values via tuning results. The P in Eq.(8)
is automatically updated in the algorithm, but we need to
set its maximum value adv . In Eq.(9), we need tune γ1
and γ2. When γ1 is tuning, we fix γ2, and vice versa. The
tuning results are given in Figure 3. From the figure, we
see γ1 = 2 and γ2 = 3 are the reasonable choices. As for
adv , we find that FR (the bigger, the better) and MAP (the
lower, the better) reach a balance when  = 0.05. There-
fore, we set the maximum adversarial perturbations magni-
tude to adv = 0.05 per frame.
4. Experiments
4.1. Experimental Setting
Datasets. Similar to [23], UCF-101 [20] and HMDB-51
[15] are used in our experiments. We randomly sample 100
videos from the UCF-101 test dataset and 50 videos from
the HMDB-51 test dataset. 16-frame snippets evenly sam-
pled from each video are input to the threat models during
the test. For convenience, the selected video snippet can all
be classified correctly by the threat models.
Threat Models. Long-term Recurrent Convolutional
Networks (LRCN) [5] and C3D [9] are used as threat mod-
els. These models are all mainstream methods for video
classification. Table 1 summarizes the test accuracy of the
threat models with 16-frame snippets on the whole UCF101
and HMDB51 datasets.
Metrics. Four metrics are used to evaluate the perfor-
mance of our method on various sides. 1) Fooling rate
(FR): the ratio of adversarial videos that are successfully
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Table 2. The results of SVAL on C3D with UCF-101 under different sparsity (S).
S(%)
Metrics 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Un-targeted
Attack
MAP 5.5395 5.3805 5.3550 - 3.2895 - -
FR(%) 100.0 100.00 100.00 80.0 100.00 80.0 60.0
Targeted
Attack
MAP 8.7538 6.6218 - - - - -
FR(%) 100.0 100.0 60.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0
misclassified. 2) Query number (Q): the times of querying
the threat models to finish the attacks. 3) Mean absolute
perturbation (MAP): denotes the mean perturbation of each
pixel in the entire video. Please see the detailed definition
in [22]. Because we have resized the pixels to 0-255, the
range of MAP in our experiments is 0-255. A small value
means good imperceptibility. 4) Sparsity (S): represents the
proportion of frames with no perturbations versus all frames
in a specific video. It is defined as: S = 1 −m/T , where
m is the length of the key frames. A large sparsity value
means that only a few frames are added the adversarial per-
turbations.
4.2. Comparing Algorithms
We compare our Sparse Video Attack (SVA) method
with Opt-attack [2] and Heuristic-attack [23]. For Opt-
attack, it is originally proposed to attack image classifica-
tion models under black-box setting. The reason we select
it as one competitor is that it can achieve smaller distor-
tion compared with some other black-box attack algorithms.
We directly extend Opt-attack to attack video models. For
Heuristic-attack, it and our method are both time-domain
sparse attack methods. We use the same parameter settings
as their original papers and official implementation code,
respectively.
Besides, one variant of our method, named SVAL, is
joined to comparisons. For SVAL algorithm, we replace the
Rattack reward in Eq.(9) with the reward Lpercentage that
used to limit the length of the key frames:
Lpercentage = ‖ 1
T
T∑
t=1
pt + S − 1‖, (11)
where S is the sparsity metric, a bigger S value, the fewer
frames will be selected. The definition of pt can be found
in Eq.(3). The SVAL algorithm only needs some videos to
train the agent without any label information. So in dif-
ferent experiments, we first randomly select 50% videos to
train agent, and then use the agent in our black-box attack
method. We still optimize the policy function via Adam.
The epochs of training is set to 20, and the learning rate is
initialized as 10−5 and decreases to its 1/10 after 15 epochs.
4.3. Performance Comparison
Because the parameter S in SVAL needs to be set, a grid
search method is used to select appropriate parameters with
different experiments. we here only show the sparsity tun-
ing for C3D model with 10 randomly sample videos from
UCF-101 dataset. The results are recorded in Table 2, where
we see that the fooling rate decreases with the rising of spar-
sity. In the un-targeted attack setting, when FR is 100%,
the smallest MAP is 3.2895. Therefore, we set S = 0.5
in the following experiment. In the targeted attack setting,
S = 0.2 is a good choice, so the setting is used in the
following experiments. In the other sparsity settings, we
use the same way to select the corresponding best results.
As shown in Table 2, it can be found that attacking a part
of the video frames is a feasible and effective way, which
would significantly reduce the perturbations of the adver-
sarial video.
The comparison results in the un-targeted setting are
listed in Table 3 in different tasks. In each task, the best per-
formance is emphasized with the bold number. As shown,
SVAL and SVA have great advantages over other methods
on the whole. On the MAP side, SVA ranks first in the
3/4 comparisons. The biggest gap between other algorithms
and SVA occurs in C3D model with UCF-101 dataset, the
MAP of SVA is only 2.4450, but others all exceed 3. Notice
that there is no one case that our methods are not as effec-
tive as other methods. On the sparsity side, SVAL and SVA
are all ahead of the others, the sparsity generated by them
all exceeds 50%. Two examples of the adversarial videos
produced with our SVA un-targeted method are shown in
Figure 5. For the first example (above the black line), the
ground-truth label is MilitaryParade, by adding the gener-
ated adversarial perturbations, the model tends to predict a
wrong label BandMarching. For the second example (be-
low the black line), the ground-truth label is flic flac, by
adding the generated adversarial perturbations, the model
tends to predict a wrong label kick ball. Besides, two ex-
amples of the adversarial videos produced with our SVA
targeted method are shown in Figure 6. It can be found that
the agent can select a small number of key and represen-
tative frames and the perturbations on the key frames are
human-imperceptible.
Usually, targeted attacks need more query number and
perturbations than un-targeted attacks. For Opt-attack and
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Table 3. The video attack results of four attack algorithms in the un-targeted mode.
Dataset TargetModel Attack Model
Metrics & Un-targeted Attack
MAP S(%) Q FR(%)
UCF-101
C3D
Opt-attack 4.2540 0.00 15076.23 74.0
Heuristic-attack 3.2980 22.08 13609.91 79.0
SVAL(ours) 3.1765 50.00 8367.78 83.0
SVA(ours) 2.4450 63.14 9402.28 86.0
LRCN
Opt-attack 2.8320 0.00 9032.68 57.0
Heuristic-attack 2.6940 17.19 9460.38 49.0
SVAL(ours) 2.4976 60.00 4131.57 68.0
SVA(ours) 2.396 62.14 6132.38 63.0
HMDB-51
C3D
Opt-attack 2.8930 0.00 13274.14 76.0
Heuristic-attack 2.4960 25.68 11870.69 78.0
SVAL(ours) 2.4482 60.00 10727.93 94.0
SVA(ours) 2.3940 51.37 24948.67 98.0
LRCN
Opt-attack 2.7586 0.00 18207.11 62.0
Heuristic-attack 2.6110 27.32 15663.41 66.0
SVAL(ours) 1.9479 70.00 10891.67 68.0
SVA(ours) 3.1570 62.50 18868.09 64.0
Heuristic-attack methods, they don’t successfully generate
any adversarial video even after 60,000 query times, which
exceeds the experimental upper bound of query number pre-
defined in section 3.4. Therefore we use “-” to represent
their performance. The comparison results are recorded in
Table 4. Obviously, the proposed methods are superior to
other methods. The FR of our methods is at least 30% in-
stead of 0% in the other competitive methods. From all
results, we can obtain the following observations: (1) Our
SVA achieves the best performance in the majority of test
tasks. (2) Attacking on key frames is an effective way to
reduce perturbations of adversarial video. (3) Mutual guid-
ance and cooperation between key frames selection and at-
tacking is helpful to select the key frames for generating
perturbations.
4.4. Ablation Study
Finally, we give the ablation study. There are three re-
wards used to guide agent to select the important frames
from the input video. In this subsection, the proposed
method in the un-targeted setting on 20 randomly selected
videos with C3D model is used for ablation study. The
ablation study for each component are given in Table 5,
where “No RL” means that the results using FGSM+NES,
and no RL module is used, “SVARattack” means RL module
is added, but only Rattack is integrated, “SVARattack+rep”
means Rattack and Rrep are both integrated, and “SVA”
means the full SVA model with Rattack, Rrep and Rdiv . It
can be shown that the attack reward Rattack significantly
improves performance. And the intrinsic rewards Rrep and
Rdiv have relatively small contributions. The MAP and S
in Table 5 are computed when FR meets the same accuracy.
Figure 4. The MAP, S, and FR indices change under the different
query number (Q) on randomly selected 20 videos and the C3D
model with our un-targeted SVA.
In addition, we also investigate the changes of MAP, S,
and FR versus different query numbers. The results are
shown in Figure 4. We can see that FR is very relevant with
the query times while MAP and S are relatively smooth ver-
sus the query times.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, a sparse black-box adversarial video at-
tack algorithm with reinforcement learning was proposed
for video recognition models. Due to a large amount of tem-
poral redundancy information of video data, we explored
the sparsity of adversarial perturbations in the video frames
through generating adversarial perturbations only on some
key video frames. Considering that key frame selection was
not only relevant to the video itself, but also the feedback
from the threat model, an agent based on attacking interac-
tion and video intrinsic properties was designed for iden-
tifying key frames while attacking. As the perturbations
were generated only for the selected frames, the proposed
method could reduce the perturbations of adversarial exam-
ples significantly. Our algorithm was applicable to multi-
ple target models and video datasets. Moreover, the experi-
mental results demonstrated that our algorithm achieved ef-
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Table 4. The video attack results of four attack algorithms in the targeted mode.
Dataset TargetModel Attack Model
Metrics & Targeted Attack
MAP S(%) Q FR(%)
UCF-101
C3D
Opt-attack - - > 60000 -
Heuristic-attack - - > 60000 -
SVAL(ours) 6.7672 20.00 43797.0 38.0
SVA(ours) 3.6450 57.24 36497.5 32.0
LRCN
Opt-attack - - > 60000 -
Heuristic-attack - - > 60000 -
SVAL(ours) 5.8834 20.00 49065.3 39.0
SVA(ours) 3.270 56.64 57850.4 41.0
HMDB-51
C3D
Opt-attack - - > 60000 -
Heuristic-attack - - > 60000 -
SVAL(ours) 6.9279 30.00 47190.3 40.0
SVA(ours) 3.8960 62.15 42900.3 38.0
LRCN
Opt-attack - - > 60000 -
Heuristic-attack - - > 60000 -
SVAL(ours) 6.2861 20.00 43880.5 32.0
SVA(ours) 3.5170 66.77 47681.9 36.0
Table 5. The ablation study of the proposed method SVA in un-
targeted setting.
Metrics ModulesNo RL SVARattack SVARattack+rep SVA
MAP 6.5037 2.3723 2.0321 1.8624
S(%) 0.00 62.35 68.75 74.65
ficient query times to the threat models. The most pertinent
area of future work is to further investigate the black-box
attack using fewer queries.
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